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ABSTRACT
The use of government-mandated report cards to diminish uncertainty about the quality of products
and services is widespread. However, report cards will have little effect if they simply confirm consumers'
prior beliefs. Moreover, documented "responses" to report cards may reflect learning about quality
that would have occurred in their absence ("market-based learning"). Using panel data on Medicare
HMO market shares between 1994 and 2002, we examine the relationship between enrollment and
quality before and after report cards were mailed to 40 million Medicare beneficiaries in 1999 and
2000. We find evidence that consumers learn from both public report cards and market-based sources,
with the latter having a larger impact during our study period. Consumers are especially sensitive to
both sources of information when the variance in HMO quality is greater. The effect of report cards
is driven by beneficiaries' responses to consumer satisfaction scores; other reported quality measures
such as the mammography rate did not affect enrollment decisions.
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Governments devote substantial resources to developing and disseminating quality report cards 
in a variety of settings, ranging from public schools to restaurants to airlines.  The value of these 
interventions depends on the strength of market-based mechanisms for learning about quality.  
For example, the value of reports by the Department of Transportation on airline delays and lost 
luggage will be minimal if consumers can easily learn about performance along these dimensions 
through word of mouth, prior experience, or a scorecard created by a private company. 
In this study we quantify the effect of the largest public report-card experiment to date, 
the release of HMO report cards in 1999 and 2000 to 40 million Medicare enrollees, on the 
subsequent healthplan choices of enrollees.  We compare the magnitude of the learning induced 
by the report cards to that of ongoing, market-based learning, as measured by the trend toward 
higher-quality plans manifested in the years prior to the intervention.  A variety of factors may 
be responsible for such learning, including word of mouth, referrals by healthcare providers, 
personal experience, privately-organized report cards, and advertising.   
We conclude that both the public report card and market-based learning produced 
substantial swings in Medicare HMO market shares during the study period, 1994-2002.  
Market-based learning was largest in markets with private-sector report cards, which provides 
secondary evidence that report cards are an effective means of disseminating quality information, 
whether publicly or privately sponsored.  The effect of report cards is entirely due to customer 
satisfaction ratings; other reported measures did not affect subsequent enrollment.  
Our parameter estimates, obtained from a model of healthplan choice, enable us to 
simulate the effects of market-based learning and report cards in a variety of scenarios.  The 
exact magnitudes of both effects depend on the number of plans and their relative quality levels.  
Some general patterns emerge from the simulations, including: (1) Market-based learning is   3
associated with dramatic (i.e. 30 percent or greater) changes in market shares of high or low-
quality plans between 1994 and 2002, where high (low) quality is defined as scoring one 
standard deviation above (below) the national mean on a composite of six audited measures of 
healthplan quality; (2) Report-card-induced learning is also associated with large swings in 
market shares, although the effect is smaller than cumulative market learning between 1994 and 
2002.  This is partly due to the low rate of enrollment in low-quality plans by the time the report 
cards are released; (3) Learning of both types has the greatest impact on market shares when 
plans are more differentiated; (4) The report cards increased net enrollment in Medicare HMOs, 
but most of the changes in HMO market shares were due to shifts in enrollment within the HMO 
market.   
In sum, we find that public report cards do tell consumers something they didn’t know 
and wouldn’t otherwise have learned on their own.  However, we also find an important role for 
market-based learning about healthcare quality, an intriguing result given the difficulties in 
measuring quality in this market. Our estimates also suggest that quality reporting is unlikely to 
generate large increases in the HMO penetration rate among Medicare beneficiaries, one of the 
stated goals of the report-card intervention. 
Our study complements recent economic research on the effects of quality report cards in 
various settings, ranging from restaurants (Jin and Leslie 2003) to public schools (e.g. Hastings 
and Weinstein 2007) to HMOs (e.g. Chernew et al. 2006, Jin and Sorensen 2006, Scanlon et al. 
2004, and Beaulieu 2002).  The Medicare experiment is noteworthy not only for its size and the 
importance of its target audience, but also for features that enable us to carefully control for and 
study behavior that may be correlated with, but not caused by, the report-card intervention.  
Chief among these is the availability of a lengthy study period, which we use to estimate the   4
pattern of market-based learning that predated the report-card intervention; data on reported as 
well as unreported quality scores, which we use to conduct a falsification exercise; and some 
data on contemporaneous quality scores, which we include together with the (lagged) reported 
scores as a robustness check to confirm that measured report-card responses are not in fact 
reactions to changes in contemporaneous quality.    
  The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 1 provides background on Medicare HMOs and 
the report card mandate imposed as part of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.  Section 2 
summarizes prior related research, and section 3 presents the data.  Section 4 describes the main 
analysis and results, and Section 5 discusses extensions and robustness tests.  Section 6 
concludes.  
 
1  Medicare HMOs and the Report Card Mandate 
Although the vast majority of Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in fee-for-service “traditional 
Medicare,” the option of receiving coverage through participating, privately-managed HMOs has 
been available since the introduction of Medicare in 1966 (Newhouse 2002).  Medicare HMOs 
offer lower out-of-pocket costs and greater benefits in exchange for reduced patient choice and 
utilization controls.  Enrollment in Medicare HMOs grew slowly at first, reaching just 1.8 
million, or 5 percent of beneficiaries, by 1993.  Between 1993 and 1998, enrollment in Medicare 
HMOs increased threefold, mirroring enrollment patterns among the privately-insured at large.  
Figure 1 graphs the HMO penetration rate for Medicare-eligibles and the privately insured 
between 1993 and 2001.  HMO penetration in both populations peaked in 1999-2000, declined 
through 2003, and has increased slightly since.  Surveys of Medicare beneficiaries find that   5
Medicare HMOs draw disproportionately from low-income, minority populations without 
supplemental private coverage.   
Although there have been many changes in the statutes governing Medicare HMOs, 
throughout our study period (1994-2002) several key features remained intact.  First, Medicare 
reimbursed participating HMOs a fixed amount per enrollee which varied by geographic area, 
gender, age, institutional and work status, and source of eligibility.  Enrollees were required to 
pay the Medicare “Part B” premium for physician and outpatient care ($54/month in 2002) 
directly to the federal government.
1 Second, HMOs were permitted to charge enrollees additional 
monthly premiums as well as service copayments, subject to regulations designed to prevent 
profit margins from the HMO’s Medicare business from exceeding profit margins on the HMO’s 
non-Medicare business. Negative premiums were not permitted.
2  The result was substantial 
premium compression from above and below, which constrained the ability of plans to “price 
out” quality differentials.   In every year in our study period, the median enrollee paid no 
premium at all, and the 75
th percentile for monthly premiums ranged between $15 and $35.
3  
Third, during the November “open enrollment” period, plans were required to accept new 
enrollees for the following January.   Most plans also accepted enrollees throughout the year, at 
                                                 
 
1  In 2001 and 2002, very small adjustments were also made for enrollees’ health status.  Between 1982 and 1997, 
the payment amount was 95 percent of the average cost for a traditional Medicare enrollee of the same age, gender, 
institutional status, and eligibility source, living in the same county. Following the BBA, payment rates were a blend 
of area costs and national costs (beginning with 90:10 and ending at 50:50 by 2003), subject to a minimum annual 
increase of 2 percent as well as an absolute floor (Newhouse 2002).  CMS began implementing a risk adjustment 
formula in 2000, with transition to full risk-adjustment delayed to 2007 by the Benefits Improvement and Protection 
Act of 2000.   Between 2001 and 2003, only 10 percent of the payment from the blend/floor formula was adjusted 
for health status, as determined by the enrollee’s “worst principal inpatient diagnosis” to date, if any.  As of 2004, 
CMS began implementing a risk-adjustment formula based on multiple sites of care (Pope et al. 2004, CMS 2004).  
2 These regulations are summarized in Newhouse (2002)  If the combination of Medicare and enrollee contributions 
exceeded the rate charged to non-Medicare enrollees (adjusted for “arbitrary” utilization factors), plans were 
required to add benefits, reduce premiums, or refund the difference to the government.  
3 Authors’ tabulations using data described in Section 3.   6
the start of each month.   Enrollees were permitted to switch plans or return to traditional 
Medicare at the end of every month.   
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA 1997) required all managed care plans 
participating in the Medicare program to gather and disclose quality data to the Health Care 
Financing Agency, now known as The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).  
Plans must report a set of standardized performance measures developed by the National 
Consortium for Quality Assurance (NCQA).
 4   These measures are collectively called The 
Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS
®).
5  Beginning in 1998, CMS began 
supplementing this data by conducting an independent annual survey of Medicare beneficiaries 
called the Consumer Assessment of Health Plans Study (CAHPS).  Respondents are asked a 
series of questions designed to assess their satisfaction with various aspects of their healthcare, 
including the communication skills of their physicians and the ease of obtaining care.   
BBA 1997 also required CMS to provide Medicare beneficiaries with information about 
health plans and the enrollment process in November of each year. CMS responded with a multi-
pronged educational campaign that included print materials, websites, telephone hotlines, 
informational sessions, and more (Goldstein et al. 2001).  As part of this effort, CMS created a 
handbook called Medicare & You, which is updated and mailed annually to all Medicare 
eligibles.  Both Medicare & You 2000 (mailed November 1999) and Medicare & You 2001 
(mailed November 2000) contained selected HEDIS and CAHPS scores for most plans operating 
in the beneficiary’s market area; plans with very low enrollments were exempted from reporting 
HEDIS data.  Figure 2 presents an excerpt of the report card printed on pages 28-35 of the 73-
                                                 
4 NCQA is a private not-for-profit organization whose mission is “to improve healthcare quality everywhere.”  In 
addition to collecting, standardizing, and releasing HEDIS data, NCQA uses this information to accredit health 
plans.  Many employers refuse to contract with unaccredited plans.   
5 HEDIS consists of a broad range of measures covering areas such as patient access to care, quality of care as 
measured by “best practices,” provider qualifications, and financial stability.   7
page Medicare & You 2001 booklet mailed to Illinois eligibles.  The editions since 2001 refer 
readers interested in quality scores to the Medicare website and a toll-free number.
6 
For the report cards to have a discernible effect on enrollee behavior, the following chain 
of events must transpire: (1) beneficiaries must read and comprehend the publications or 
communicate with someone who has done so; (2) beneficiaries must change their beliefs about 
plan quality in response to the reported scores; (3) these changes must be of sufficient magnitude 
to imply a change in the optimal plan for some enrollees; (4) some of these enrollees must take 
actions to switch to their optimal plan.  The enrollment changes we examine will only reveal the 
extent to which these requirements were collectively satisfied by Medicare & You. 
There are several other formal and informal mechanisms for enrollees to learn about the 
quality of Medicare HMOs, including word of mouth, prior experience in a private-sector HMO 
offered by the same carrier, current experience in the Medicare HMO, information provided 
directly by the HMO, and publications of quality measures for a private-sector HMO offered by 
the same carrier.  Some carriers made their HEDIS scores for private-sector enrollees available 
on NCQA’s website.  The popular magazine U.S. News & World Report published selected 
scores for all of these plans in their annual “America’s Top HMOs” series from 1996-1998. 
Of the 16 percent of beneficiaries who reported seeking managed care information in a 
nationwide survey conducted in 2001, the majority used non-CMS information sources.  The 
most frequent sources cited were the managed care plans themselves, followed by physicians and 
                                                 
6 The quality data was available some months earlier on the web (January 1999) and through the telephone helpline 
(March 1999).    However, surveys suggest this information was rarely accessed through these sources in 1999.  A 
survey performed at 6 case study locations in 1999 showed that only 2 percent of beneficiaries used the internet to 
obtain any Medicare information (Goldstein 1999).  By 2001, only 6 percent of beneficiaries reported using the 
Medicare helpline for any reason (Goldstein et al 2001).  We therefore consider the report card mailing to be the 
primary source of exposure to the quality data, and use 2000 as the first post-intervention year.   8
their staff, and friends and family (Goldstein et al. 2001).  These statistics suggest a substantial 
role for market-based learning, a hypothesis that is supported by the empirical results.  
 
2 Prior  Research  
The few empirical papers on market-based learning focus on the ability of consumers to learn 
about the quality of so-called “experience goods” through personal experience.  These studies 
find rapid learning in markets with low switching costs (e.g. yogurt, Ackerberg 2002), but slower 
learning when switching costs are high (e.g. auto insurance, Israel 2005).  Hubbard (2002) finds 
evidence that consumers also learn through the aggregate experiences of others: vehicle 
emissions inspectors with low aggregate failure rates enjoy more business, controlling for 
consumers’ prior experience at these firms. 
Recent studies suggest that report cards also facilitate consumer learning.  Jin and Leslie 
(2003) find that restaurants posting an “A” grade enjoyed a 5-percent revenue boost relative to 
restaurants posting a “B.”  They find no evidence that revenues responded to changes in hygiene 
scores during the two years before grade cards were introduced.  There are at least two reasons to 
expect more market-based learning about Medicare HMOs as compared to restaurants.  First, in a 
broad class of learning models, learning will occur most rapidly in new markets, and the 
restaurant market is much more mature.  Second, market-based mechanisms that facilitate 
learning are more likely to evolve in healthcare due to the magnitude of spending involved as 
well as the private incentives for large, private-sector buyers to assess quality.  
Several recent studies estimate the impact of healthplan report cards on enrollment 
decisions.  Most pursue a before-and-after research design in which the intervention is a report-
card provided by an employer.  These studies find small increases in the market share of highly-  9
rated plans offered to employees of the federal government (Wedig and Tai-Seale 2002), 
Harvard University (Beaulieu 2002), and General Motors (Chernew et al. 2006 and Scanlon et al. 
2002).
7  If market-based learning is occurring independently of the report cards, even these 
modest effects may overstate their influence.    
Our study design is most similar to Jin and Sorensen (2006), who compare responses of 
federal retirees (and their survivors) to quality ratings for plans that did and did not make these 
ratings publicly available (via the periodical U.S. News and World Report and a website 
maintained by the National Committee for Quality Assurance).  The report-card effect is 
measured by the difference in responses.  Thus, the “response” to ratings for nondisclosing plans 
is akin to market-based learning.
8  Jin and Sorensen find evidence of both effects.  Chernew et al 
(2006) also document a potentially important role for market-based learning.  Using data from 
General Motors, they estimate a formal Bayesian learning model, in which consumers update 
their priors on plan quality using the signal provided by report cards.  They find reported 
information had a small but statistically-significant impact on consumer beliefs.  The high weight 
on the priors may be due in part to confidence in market-based learning that had already taken 
place prior to the report-card intervention.  
A key advantage of these studies relative to ours is significant variation in plan prices, 
conditional on all covariates included in the estimating models.  This variation identifies enrollee 
responsiveness to price, which in turn can be used to scale responsiveness to quality into dollar 
terms.  We lack such variation and therefore present our findings in terms of market-share 
                                                 
7 The report card released to federal employees included six highly-correlated measures of enrollee satisfaction 
gathered through mailed survey responses.  Wedig and Tai-Seale include two of these measure in their models: 
overall quality of care and plan coverage.  The Harvard and GM report cards included HEDIS measures as well as 
patient satisfaction scores.  Beaulieu (2002), Chernew et al. (2001), and Scanlon et al. (2002) use aggregations of all 
reported scores in logit models of plan choice. 
8 Technically, we consider privately-organized report cards to be “market-based” sources, so the term “non-report-
card learning” would be more precise here.   10
responses.  These studies also have individual-level data, which facilitates interesting 
comparisons of behavior across different groups (e.g. new enrollees vs. existing enrollees, 
families vs. individuals). 
Our study contributes to the literature on consumer responses to report cards by 
controlling for and examining market-based learning that likely confounds estimated report-card 
responses in many studies, by providing estimates of the relative importance of both types of 
learning, and by doing so in the context of the largest healthcare report-card experiment to date.   
 
3 Data  
We use several datasets available online or through direct requests to CMS.  We obtain 
enrollment data from the Medicare Managed Care Quarterly State/County/Plan Data Files for 
December of each year from 1994 to 2002.
 9  Enrollment is available at the plan-county-year 
level, where “plan” refers to a unique contract number assigned by CMS.
10  Note that carriers 
may offer several different products within the same plan, such as a benefits package that 
includes prescription drug coverage and one that does not.  Enrollment and benefits data is not 
available at this level of detail throughout the study period.  Fortunately, the quality scores in 
Medicare and You were reported at the plan level, so combining enrollment across products 
within the same plan should not bias the coefficient estimates.   Plan-county-year cells with 
fewer than 10 enrollees are not included in the data.  The enrollment files also contain the base 
                                                 
9 http://cms.hhs.gov/healthplans/statistics/mpscpt.   
10 CMS assigns unique contract numbers to carriers (e.g. Aetna) for each geographic area they serve.  Because these 
geographic areas are defined by the carriers and areas served by different carriers need not coincide, we follow CMS 
in considering the county as our market definition.      11
CMS payment rate for HMO enrollees in each county, as well as the total number of Medicare 
eligibles in each county.
11   
The plan-level quality measures included in Medicare & You 2000 and 2001 were 
extracted from the Medicare HEDIS files and the Medicare Compare Database.
12  Three 
measures were reported in each booklet: one from the HEDIS dataset, one from the CAHPS 
survey (included in the Medicare Compare Database), and the voluntary disenrollment rate.
13  
The reported HEDIS measure in both years is mammography, the percent of women aged 50-69 
who had a mammogram within the past 2 years.  The CAHPS measure reported in Medicare & 
You 2000 is communicate, the percent of enrollees who reported that the doctors in their plan 
always communicate well.  Medicare & You 2001 replaced communicate with best care, the 
percent of enrollees who rated their own care as the “best possible,” a rating of 10 out of 10.  The 
reported HEDIS scores were based on data gathered by plans 3 years prior, while the CAHPS 
scores and disenrollment rates were lagged 2 years.  Appendix Table 1 provides detail on the 
sources and data years for reported scores.   
Although Medicare & You reports the disenrollment rate for each plan, we do not include 
this measure in our analyses because it is a lagged component of the dependent variable 
(enrollment).  The three reported scores we match to the enrollment data are therefore 
mammography from 2000 (which is highly correlated with reported 2001 scores),
14 communicate 
                                                 
11 The base payment rate is county and year-specific, and is adjusted to reflect enrollee characteristics.  See footnote 
1 for details. 
12 HEDIS data is available at http://cms/hhs.gov/healthplans/HEDIS/HEDISdwn.asp.  CAHPS data is available from 
the Medicare Compare Database at http://www.medicare.gov/Download/DownloadDB.asp. 
13 Involuntary disenrollment is produced by plan exits.  Participating plans must accept all Medicare beneficiaries 
desiring to enroll.   
14 The correlation coefficient for mammography reported in 2000 and mammography reported in 2001 is .86.   12
from 2000, and best care from 2001.  To facilitate comparisons across measures, we create z-
scores for each year and measure.
15   
The HEDIS files also include the three measures that were audited by CMS but not 
included in the publications: beta blocker (the percent of enrollees aged 35+ receiving a beta 
blocker prescription upon discharge from the hospital after a heart attack), ambulatory visit (the 
percent of enrollees who had an ambulatory or preventive-care visit in the past year), and 
diabetic eye exams (the percent of diabetic enrollees aged 31+ who had a retinal examination in 
the past year.  We use these measures to compute unreported composite, which is the average of 
a plan’s z-scores on all three unreported measures.
16 
  Most plans report a single set of quality measures pertaining to all of their enrollees.  A 
small number of plans report data separately by submarket, e.g. San Francisco and Sacramento.  
These submarkets do not correspond to county boundaries, so we create enrollee-weighted 
average scores by plan in these cases, using enrollment data reported in the HEDIS files.  For 
plans reporting CAHPS data separately by submarket, we create simple averages by plan because 
the CAHPS files do not include enrollments, and the CAHPS submarkets do not always 
correspond to the HEDIS submarkets. 
Our sample includes plans with quality data for all six measures.  Note the quality data is 
measured at a single point in time, and it is matched to the panel data on plan enrollments.  In 
Section 5, we describe and utilize the panel data that is available for some of the quality 
measures.   
                                                 





= , where 
x  is the sample mean and s the sample standard deviation.   When calculating z-scores, we count the scores for 
each plan only once, and include all plans with nonmissing values for that score.  There is no substantive difference 
between results obtained using normalized and raw scores. 
16 The unreported measures were obtained from the same source as mammography in 2000, and therefore pertain to 
data from 1996-97.   13
We obtain the minimum monthly enrollee premium for each plan and year from the 
December Medicare Coordinated Care Plans Monthly Report for 1994-1998, and directly from 
CMS for 2000-2002.
17  We estimate 1999 premiums using the average of each plan’s 1998 and 
2000 premiums, where available.  We also construct an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 
if a plan had an affiliate that was rated at least once by U.S. News.  A plan is considered to have 
such an affiliate if both the Medicare plan and the plan appearing in U.S. News had a common 
carrier (e.g. CIGNA, Humana) and state; Medicare plans were not directly included in the U.S. 
News publications.
18   
Last, we use the annual March Current Population Survey (CPS) for 1994-2002 to obtain 
the income distribution for individuals aged 65+.  For each year, we calculate the quintiles of the 
national income distribution.  Next, we calculate the fraction of the elderly falling into each 
quintile for every county.  For counties that are too small to be identified in the CPS, we assign 
figures obtained for the relevant state and year.    
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the complete plan-county-year dataset.  During 
the study period, HMO enrollment averaged 3,557 per plan-county, or just under 5 percent  
percent of eligible enrollees in the county.   Nearly two-thirds of the observations come from 
plans whose affiliates were rated by U.S. News.  Table 2 provides additional detail regarding the 
number of competitors in each market and the variation in quality scores within markets.  For 
markets with more than one HMO, we calculate the difference between the maximum and 
minimum reported quality scores in each market, and report the means in Table 2.  The table 
                                                 
17 The Medicare Coordinated Care Plans Monthly Reports are available at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/healthplans/statistics/monthly/.  Many plans offer multiple products with varying benefits 
and premiums.   We follow the literature and select the minimum premium. 
18 When the carrier name did not appear as part of the plan name, carrier identity was obtained by examining names 
in prior and subsequent years, performing literature searches, and searching the Interstudy database of  publicly-
reported data on HMOs.  We do not incorporate the ratings measures reported by U.S. News due to the high number 
of missing values.   14
reveals substantial variation in quality within markets.  For example, in markets with 2 
competitors, the mean difference in mammography scores is 8.85 points, or .86 after the scores 
are normalized.  In markets with 3 or more competitors, the mean spread between the highest and 
lowest-scoring plan is 15.23 points.  Table 3 presents a correlation matrix for the quality scores.  
Mammography is highly correlated with unreported composite, but uncorrelated with 
communicate and best care, the correlated subjective measures from the CAHPS survey.
19   
 
4 Analysis 
Each participating market contains plans with different quality levels, so the report-card mandate 
effectively created hundreds of “mini-experiments” that we use to identify the response to the 
reported information.  Some of the observed changes in enrollments following the mandate may 
be due to market-based learning, so we control for the underlying trend toward highly-rated 
plans.  Assuming this trend would have continued in the absence of the report cards, we can 
estimate the report-card effect by comparing the deviation from trend following the intervention.  
We use the data on unreported scores to conduct a falsification exercise, i.e. to confirm that 
consumers do not “react” the same way to unreported scores.  In section 5 (Extensions and 
Robustness) we use the limited panel data on quality to confirm that measured report-card 
responses are not in fact responses to changes in contemporaneous quality.    
4.1 Methods 
We estimate a discrete choice demand model in which each Medicare enrollee selects the option 
in her county that offers her the highest utility, including the “outside good” represented by 
                                                 
19 These correlations have been noted by other researchers, e.g. Schneider et al. (2001).   15
traditional Medicare.
20  As is well-known, the standard assumption of i.i.d. errors in consumer 
utility produces stringent restrictions on the substitution patterns across options.  Our utility 
specification has a separate “nest” for HMOs to permit the substitution among HMOs to differ 
from substitution between HMOs and traditional Medicare.  We also allow individual income to 
affect the propensity to select the HMO nest by interacting dummies for the individual’s income 
quintile with the dummy for the HMO nest.
 21  Quintiles allow more flexibility than a linear 
interaction with income, and can be reasonably well-estimated given the CPS data available in 
each market and year. The utility consumer i obtains from selecting plan j in market c(s)t and 
nest g can be written 
(1)  uijc(s)t = xjc(s)tβ - αpjc(s)t + ξjc(s)t +φiζg + (1-σ)εijc(s)t. 
c(s)t denotes a county (within state s) during year t; the notation c(s) reflects the fact that some 
variables are at the state rather than the county level.  (We follow CMS and consider the county 
as the market definition.)  The xjc(s)t are observed plan-market-year characteristics (described 
below), pjc(s)t is the  monthly premium charged by the plan, ξjc(s)t represents the mean utility to 
consumers of unobserved plan-market-year characteristics, ζg is a dummy for choices in nest g,  
and εijc(s)t is an i.i.d. extreme value random error term.
22  We define φi =diγ+υi, where di is a set 
of dummies for the income quintiles, and υi is independent random term that reflects individual-
specific preferences for HMOs that are uncorrelated with income.  As in Cardell (1997) and 
                                                 
20All Medicare enrollees have the same choice set within the county.   
21Ideally, we would interact additional consumer characteristics, such as health status and wealth, with the choice of 
the HMO nest; unfortunately, we lack county-year data on these characteristics, and the fixed effects in the 
specifications preclude the use of more aggregated data.  Empirically, however, these three measures are strongly 
correlated. In addition, researchers studying healthplan choice in the Medicare population have found income to be 
the strongest predictor of decisions (Dowd et al. 1994).  
22 Town and Liu (2003) point out that this premium should be expressed relative to the traditional FFS “premium,” 
which can be viewed as the expected out-of-pocket costs associated with achieving the same benefits offered by an 
HMO while enrolling in traditional FFS Medicare.  They use Medigap premiums as an estimate of these costs.  
These premiums are only available at the state-year level, however, so they would not affect the premium coefficient 
in our models, which include state-year fixed effects.   16
Berry (1994), we assume the distribution of υi is such that υi + (1-σ)εijc(s)t is an extreme value 
random variable.  Under this assumption, the parameter σ will range between 0 and 1, with 
values closer to 1 indicating the within-nest correlation of utility levels is high and values closer 
to 0 indicating that substitution patterns do not differ across nests.  The mean utility of traditional 
Medicare, denoted by j=0, is normalized to zero.   
As compared to a reduced-form demand equation, our method not only emerges from a 
structural model of choice but also corrects for changes in the choice set, e.g. those caused by 
entry and exit.  This model is particularly appropriate for our analysis because of the frequency 
of healthplan exit in the post-BBA era.  It generates consistent utility parameters that do not 
depend on the specific competitors in a market.  We can then use these parameters to measure 
the effects of report cards, abstracting away from entry and exit that independently affect 
enrollment.   The model captures both movement across HMOs and movement between 
traditional Medicare and HMOs.   
For our primary specification, we define the vector of observed plan-market-year 
characteristics to be 
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This specification includes a separate time trend for each reported score l to capture 
learning about that score over time, as well as interactions between each score and a post dummy 
to capture deviations from trend following the publication of individual scores.  For 
mammography and communicate, 
l
t post  takes a value of 1 beginning in 2000; for best care, 
l
t post  equals 1 beginning in 2001.  To determine the functional form for f(yeart), we estimate 












j post score year f score , are replaced with interactions between a single score and 
dummies for every year, i.e.  t
l
j score τ * .  This specification allows for a flexible learning pattern 
and easy detection of post-reporting deviations from trend.  We cannot include all scores jointly 
in this manner as the data cannot identify 24 parameters at once (3 scores*8 year dummies), but 
we use the results from these separate regressions to select f(yeart), and to inform our discussion 
of the results. 
Before discussing the control variables, we have two additional conceptual remarks.   
First, our model focuses on enrollee responses to report cards; for the most part, plan responses 
are not incorporated into the analysis.  There is, of course, potential for a supply-side response: 
plans could choose to exit, invest in raising reported scores, reduce quality in unreported 
dimensions, and/or advertise their quality (although this latter practice is unlikely as it attracts 
high-risk enrollees).
23  Only the last of these activities will be captured by our study.
24   In the 
final section, we discuss why we are unable to study supply-side responses, and why these 
responses are likely to be small during the study period.  The second point is that our main 
specification explores the relationship over time between enrollment and reported quality, which 
is measured at a single point in time.  This model isolates the effect of the report cards by 
controlling for the enrollment trend toward highly-rated plans that was evident prior to their 
                                                 
23 Mehrotra et al. 2006, “The Relationship Between Health Plan Advertising and Market Incentives: Evidence of 
Risk-Selective Behavior,” Health Affairs 25(1): 759-65.  In fact, Medicare HMOs successfully recruited healthier-
than-average beneficiaries, a practice denounced as “cream-skimming”  (Batata 2004, “The Effect of HMOs on Fee-
For-Service Health Care Expenditures: Evidence from Medicare Revisited, Journal of Health Economics 23(5): 
951-63.)   Melhotra et al find “the use of ads that are attractive to healthy patients increased nationally from the 
1970s through the 1990s.”  Features of such ads include small print, pictures of active seniors, and mentions of 
“wellness programs.” 
24 If plans publicize quality prior to the release of report cards, this will be incorporated in the estimate of the 
market-based learning trends and cause a downward bias in our estimated report-card effect.  As noted, however, 
quality advertising is unlikely, especially in a market where selection is critical for plan profits.  Moreover, the 
report-card response we find is sudden and occurs immediately following the release of the satisfaction score (one 
year after the other two scores were released).    18
release.   This trend is consistent with market-based learning, but there are other possible 
explanations.  In section 5, we describe a series of extensions and robustness checks we perform 
to evaluate alternative hypotheses.  Note these hypotheses affect the interpretation of the trend 
coefficients, but not of the estimated report-card effects. 
In all specifications, we include plan fixed effects  ) ( j ω  to capture time-invariant 
differences in the unobservable quality of plans (as perceived by consumers), and county fixed 
effects ( ) s ( c κ ) to capture time-invariant differences in consumer utility across markets.  Such 
differences can be driven by local demographics, economic conditions, and market structure.  
For example, HMO penetration in the private sector is larger in urban counties and on the west 
coast.  To the extent that Medicare HMO penetration tracks private sector penetration, county 
fixed effects will eliminate the time-invariant component of these differences across counties. 
The county fixed effects also imply that we are examining the relationship between relative 
quality scores within a county and plan market shares in that county.  Because changes in 
national or state economic conditions and regulations may be correlated with quality levels and 
enrollment decisions, we also include state-year fixed effects, denoted by st ψ . 
4.2  Estimation  
To estimate the parameters of the utility function described by (1), we use the approaches 
delineated in Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), hereafter BLP.  These 
papers outline estimation methods that can be implemented using data on the distribution of 
consumer characteristics in each market and the market shares of all products.  Market shares are 
a nonlinear function of the mean utility for products; the utility parameters are recovered by first 
inverting the equations for market share, and then regressing mean utility on covariates.  The 
inversion formula has a closed-form solution in the case of a logit or a nested logit; in these   19
models, individual heterogeneity is assumed to be averaged out across the sample, so only the 
aggregate unobserved characteristic (ξjc(s)t) remains. 
  In our model, the individual’s income quintile is permitted to affect the mean utility of 
plans within the HMO nest.  Applying Berry (1994), we can write the following equation for 
mean plan utility δ: 
(3)     ) ln( ) ln( ) ln(
) ( ) / ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 0 ) ( ) (
q
t s c g j
q






t s jc s x p s s σ + γ + ξ + β + α = − ≡ δ , 
where q denotes income quintiles, 
q
t s jc s ) ( denotes absolute market share for plan j in county c 
(within state s) and year t, 
q
t s c s ) ( 0 denotes absolute market share for the outside good, and 
q
t s c g j s
) ( ) / ( denotes plan j’s market share among HMO enrollees in c(s)t. (
q
t s c g j s
) ( ) / ( is also called the 
“within group share.”)  Note we have replaced φiζg  in equation (1) with gamma 
q γ  (q=1,2…5), 
which economizes on notation given our specification. (Because we have one nest g we omit the 
g subscript on 
q γ ). 
  We do not observe 
q
t s jc s ) (  and 
q
t s c s ) ( 0 , so we cannot use (3) as our estimating equation.  
The Appendix provides greater detail on how we recover parameter estimates.
 25  Because the 
choice of HMO conditional on selecting the HMO nest is a simple logit, the closed-form 
market share inversion formula can be utilized as part of the procedure to derive mean utilities. 
However, the choice between the outside good and the HMO nest is a function of individual 
income, so no closed-form solution for this layer of the choice problem exists.  Holding
q γ  fixed, 
we apply BLP’s contraction mapping method to obtain the dependent variable for a linear 
estimating equation: 
(4)     ) ln(
) ( ) / ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( t s c g j s x p t c js t c js t c js t s jc σ ξ β α δ + + + ≡ . 
                                                 
25 We thank Yongbae Lee for developing and implementing our estimation.   20
The derivation of this equation is presented in the Appendix.  
q γ is then estimated via 3-stage 
GMM where the moment conditions are adjusted to reflect the possibility of serial correlation in 
errors for the same plan-county.
26 
Due to the large number of moment conditions (over 800) relative to the number of 
observations (N=8,212), in practice our sample covariance matrix is singular.  To obtain an 
invertible matrix to use in the multi-stage GMM procedure, we use the sample covariance 
estimator proposed by Ledoit and Wolf (2004). This estimator is designed to address precisely 
our situation: many moment conditions relative to the sample size.  The estimator is a weighted 
average of the sample covariance matrix and an arbitrary diagonal matrix (e.g. the identity 
matrix).  The latter matrix ensures invertibility.  Consistency is obtained by allowing the weight 
on the sample covariance matrix to approach 1 as the sample size increases.  We use Ledoit and 
Wolf’s estimator to obtain an invertible matrix for our first n-1 iterations, and the sample 
covariance matrix for all reported standard errors. 
4.3  Identification 
Our model assumes no time-varying omitted variable is simultaneously correlated with any 
regressor as well as with enrollment.  In this section, we discuss our efforts to address omitted 
variables bias in all the regressors of interest.   
Both price and the within-group share in equations (3) and (4) above may be correlated 
with ξjc(s)t,  which represents the mean utility of unobserved shocks to plan quality.  Because the 
model includes plan, county, and state-year fixed effects, correlation between price and the error 
term will only occur if changes in price for a given plan-county are correlated with changes in 
quality for that plan-county, controlling for any changes that are common to all plan-counties in 
                                                 
26 To use the terminology of BLP (1995), we modify the moment conditions so as to treat the sum of the moment 
conditions for each plan-county as a single observation.   21
that state.  Such a correlation would arise, for example, if United Healthcare of Illinois, which 
operates in several Illinois counties, increased its unobserved quality and price only in Cook 
County.  Correlation between the within-group share and the error term will occur if changes in 
plan j’s unobservable quality in a given county (controlling for changes common to the state) are 
correlated with changes in how attractive plan j is relative to other plans available in that county.   
Given this potential for omitted variables bias, we include instruments for both measures 
in all specifications.  We follow Town & Liu (2003) in using the following 6 variables in our set 
of instruments: the minimum, maximum, and mean payment amount by CMS for the other 
counties in which plan j operates during year t; the mean number of competing plans in those 
counties in year t, the one-year lagged number of hospitals in county c, and the one-year lagged 
number of hospital beds in county c.
27    The first four of these reflect the competitive conditions 
the HMO faces in other markets.  If there are economics of scale or scope in operating an HMO, 
these conditions will be correlated with the costs of operating in county c.  The county-level 
hospital figures should also be correlated with HMO costs, as HMOs in counties with increasing 
supply should be better-able to negotiate lower input prices.
28  These cost-shifters are assumed to 
be uncorrelated with unobserved quality. 
We also use functions of competitors’ characteristics as instruments for within-group 
share.  These will be valid instruments if competitors do not alter their product characteristics in 
response to changes in plan j’s unobserved quality, and if competitors’ entry/exit decisions are 
                                                 
27 Town & Liu include as instruments the minimum, maximum, and mean premium charged by plan j in the other 
counties in which it operates in year t.  In our data, premium does not vary across the counties in which plan j 
operates.  The difference appears to be due to a different definition of “plan.” 
28  However, the inclusion of county and state-year fixed effects in the regression leaves little variation in these 
measures.       22
uncorrelated with changes in plan j’s unobserved quality.
29  We use indicator variables for not-
for-profit ownership, chain membership, and whether the HMO is organized as an “Independent 
Practice Association (IPA).”
30  These variables are reported annually to CMS and are good 
individual predictors of sjc(s)t|gc(s)t in separate first-stage regressions. 
We take all of the quality*time interactions to be exogenous.  In the case of the learning 
trends, this means we are ruling out any time-varying factors that affect enrollment decisions and 
are also correlated with plan quality, except those that are common to a given state and year.  For 
example, if high-quality plans within each state are likelier to increase the benefits they provide, 
increases in the popularity of such plans will reflect these changes and not learning about a given 
quality level.  Section 5 provides several tests of this demanding assumption.   The identifying 
assumption for the report-card effect is much less strenuous: it rules out the possibility of 
changes in omitted factors timed to the report-card release and correlated with plan quality, again 
excluding any changes occurring statewide.   For example, if the BBA included other provisions 
that differentially affected low- and high-quality plans within a given state, and these provisions 
coincided with the release of the report cards, these would be included in the report-card effect.  
We discuss this possibility in Section 5.4. 
4.4 Results 
We begin by examining the results from the specifications using a single reported score 
interacted with individual year dummies.  Figure 3 plots the estimated coefficients on these 
interactions; the data is presented in Appendix Table 2.  The vertical line in each graph signifies 
                                                 
29 The inclusion of plan fixed effects relaxes the usual assumptions substantially; rather than positing that observable 
competitor characteristics are uncorrelated with unobservable plan characteristics, we only require changes in 
observable competitor characteristics to be uncorrelated with changes in unobservable plan characteristics.   
30IPA-model HMOs contract with independent physicians and groups of physicians, and they tend to offer a broader 
network of providers than “staff-model” or “group-model” HMOs, in which physicians are fully or mostly employed 
by the HMO.      23
the start of the post period for each measure. We draw three conclusions from these graphs.  
First, mean utility for plans with higher scores is increasing throughout the study period.  
Second, the only measure that clearly deviates upward from trend during the post-period is best 
care.  Prior to the report-card intervention, plans with high best care scores were generating 
more utility over time, but at a decreasing rate.  In the first year after best care was reported, the 
effect of best care on utility increased more than it had over the three prior years combined.  
Third, it appears that a log time trend is more appropriate than a linear time trend for modeling 
the underlying increase in utility for plans with high scores.
31 
The first column in Table 4 presents results from a model with log trends for each 
reported score as well as interactions between each reported score and post; i.e. the specification 
in which  t s jc x ) (  is represented by equation (2) above. The reported coefficients are estimates of 
the mean marginal utilities associated with the corresponding scores in different years.  Thus the 
positive coefficients on the trend variables imply that consumers value higher-quality plans more 
over time (at a decreasing rate).  The trend for mammography is statistically significant at p<.01, 
the trend for communicate is marginally significant, and the trend for best care is smaller and 
imprecisely-estimated.  As we will see below, the point estimates and statistical significance of 
the individual trends fluctuate from one specification to the next, but combining the measures 
into a composite and estimating a single market-learning coefficient produces sizeable, 
significant, and stable estimates.   
The post interactions reveal that plans with high best care scores generate significantly 
more utility following the publication of their scores.  Publicizing the scores for mammography 
and communicate does not have a significant impact on utility; we easily reject the null 
                                                 
31The concave trend is consistent with a learning model in which a decreasing percentage of the population learns 
each year.   24
hypothesis of equality between either coefficient and best care*post.
32  The estimate of the 
nesting parameter, .0.838 (.046), strongly indicates a separate nest for HMOs is appropriate. 
In this and all subsequent specifications, the premium coefficient is small and imprecisely 
estimated. We attribute this result both to premium compression (discussed above), and to the 
inclusion of fixed effects that absorb nearly all of the variation in premiums that helps to identify 
this parameter in other studies.
33  As described in Section 4, these fixed effects are important for 
mitigating omitted variables bias in the score coefficients.  The casualty is the price coefficient.  
Unfortunately, without it we are unable to monetize the value of changes in ratings, as in 
Chernew et al (2006).  As a result, we report all findings in terms of market shares. 
  The estimates of the income quintile dummies appear at the bottom of each column in 
Table 4.
34  In all specifications, the 
q ˆ γ  increase in q, and 
3 ˆ γ and 
4 ˆ γ are statistically 
distinguishable from the top (omitted) quintile.  These estimates indicate that the poorest and 
wealthiest beneficiaries avoid Medicare HMOs.  The low penetration among the affluent is easily 
explained: the carrots of better benefits and lower copays are least valuable for this population.  
They are better able to finance out-of-pocket expenses, and most likely to have supplemental 
“Medigap” coverage, often subsidized by former employers.  At first blush, the finding that the 
least affluent are not significantly more likely to enroll in Medicare HMOs than the most affluent 
is surprising.   However, there are at least two plausible explanations for this result.   
                                                 
32The negative coefficient estimate on communicate*post, though statistically insignificant, reflects the concave 
learning trend for communicate revealed in Figure 3.  
33A regression of premiums on all of the fixed effects in our model produces an R-squared of 0.79.  If we estimate 
our model without state-year fixed effects, we obtain a negative and statistically significant price coefficient.   
34 Some county-years have few corresponding observations in the CPS, leading to noisy estimates of the income distribution. We 
experimented by replacing the county-year income distribution with the state-year income distribution for those county-years 
with fewer than 5, 10 or 20 income observations in the CPS. This had little impact on the estimated parameters, so we retained 
the original data. 
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First, recent data shows that 15 percent of Medicare beneficiaries are also eligible for 
Medicaid, the public insurance program for the indigent.
35  Medicaid is responsible for all 
copays for so-called “dual eligibles,” and these individuals are also entitled to the more 
comprehensive benefits provided under Medicaid (including prescription drug coverage, which 
was not offered in traditional Medicare during our study period).  Additional groups of low-
income beneficiaries (known as “Qualified Medicare Beneficiaries” (QMBs) or “Specified Low 
Income Medicare Beneficiaries” (SPLIMBs)) who do not qualify for Medicaid can receive 
subsidies to cover charges associated with traditional Medicare.  Hence the poorest beneficiaries 
might not benefit from Medicare HMOs.
36  Second, lower-income beneficiaries may find it 
particularly challenging to enroll in a Medicare HMO.  Whereas enrollment/reenrollment in 
traditional Medicare is virtually automatic, selecting and enrolling in a Medicare HMO requires 
significant cognitive skills and effort.  Our results are consistent with a 1988 survey of Medicare 
beneficiaries in the Twin Cities metropolitan area, which had several Medicare HMOs at the 
time.  This survey found the lowest and highest-income beneficiaries were least likely to enroll 
in Medicare HMOs (Dowd et al 1994).  
Column 2 of Table 4 presents the results obtained by adding unreported 
composite*ln(year) and unreported composite*post to the specification in column (1).  Again, 
only best care deviates significantly from trend in the post-reporting period.  Given the high 
correlation between mammography and unreported composite, it is unsurprising that the 
coefficients on the interactions with these scores are noisily estimated when jointly included.  
However, we again find significantly different responses to best care and communicate, despite 
                                                 
35 http://www.medpac.gov/publications/congressional_reports/Jun04DatabookSec2.pdf 
36 This argument assumes the utility from FFS care with no copays exceeds that of managed care.  Although some 
enrollees may prefer services provided by managed care companies (e.g. a primary physician who is apprised of all 
health concerns in her role as gatekeeper), surveys suggest the lower out-of-pocket expenses/greater benefits are the 
main attraction (Gold et al 2004).   26
the high raw correlation of these satisfaction scores.  To explore why, we extracted additional 
measures from the CAHPS survey of consumer satisfaction, and find that one of these measures, 
“ease of obtaining specialist referrals,” is highly correlated with the component of best care that 
is uncorrelated with communicate.   Further analysis confirms this factor is driving the observed 
responsiveness to best care.   
Given that the market-based learning coefficients on all scores in column 2 are of similar 
magnitude, and that none is precisely estimated, column 3 replaces the individual trends with a 
trend for composite, which is the average z-score of all 6 measures (i.e. the 3 reported scores as 
well as the 3 unreported scores).  This trend is statistically significant at p<.001, and the pattern 
of post interactions is unchanged.  We use this parsimonious specification for the simulations, 
extensions, and robustness checks that follow.   
4.5  Simulations 
The magnitudes of the coefficients reported in Table 4 are not readily interpretable.  However, 
we can use them to simulate how enrollee choices in hypothetical markets change over time and 
in response to the publication of report cards.  Any simulation will be sensitive to the 
assumptions chosen.  Our assumptions enable us to focus on the absolute and relative importance 
of market-based and report-card-induced learning.   
In all scenarios we consider, we predict market shares in the presence and absence of the 
Medicare report cards.  We also consider the effects of varying the quality and number of plans.  
We abstract away from time trends unrelated to consumer learning (the state*year fixed effects) 
and do not allow for entry and exit.   As in the estimation models, quality for each plan is fixed 
over time.  To the extent the report-card mandate stimulated quality improvements and/or exit by 
low-quality plans, our simulations underestimate the total effect of report cards.  The proportion   27
of individuals in each income quintile is set to 20 percent.  Below, we discuss the impact of 
varying this distribution.  We set the premiums for all plans equal to zero and treat these as 
exogenously-determined; due to the small estimated premium coefficient, these assumptions do 
not impact our results.  We select a plan fixed effect (i.e. a measure of unobserved, time-
invariant plan-level quality) that generates an average market share of 2.74 percentage points, the 
nationwide average in 1994.  Normalizing the market shares of all plans to this initial value 
enables us to easily compare growth patterns across plans and markets.  Our assumptions ensure 
that plans with the same quality scores will have the same average market shares in any given 
year, though actual shares will differ due to the idiosyncratic error term.   
All simulations use parameter estimates and residuals from the model presented in Table 
4, Column 3.  Each simulation incorporates a randomly-drawn vector of residuals representing 
the unobserved, time-varying quality of the plans.
37  We perform 10,000 simulations for each 
scenario and year and report the mean predicted market shares and standard errors of these 
means.   
The first set of scenarios is designed to illustrate learning in typical markets.  We look to 
the data to select the characteristics of such markets.  Referring to Table 2, the percent of county-
year markets with 1, 2, and 3+ HMO plans on offer is 55, 20, and 14, respectively.  However, the 
percent of HMO enrollees in such markets is 11, 13, and 75, respectively.
38  For completeness, 
we present results for hypothetical markets with 1, 2, and 3 HMO plans. 
In the hypothetical monopoly market, we consider 3 alternative quality levels for the sole 
plan.  The “low quality” plan scores 1 standard deviation below the mean on all quality 
measures, the “medium quality” plan scores at the mean, and the “high quality” plan scores 1 
                                                 
37 The number of elements in this vector is determined by the number of plans in the scenario. 
38 There are 4107 county-year markets in our dataset.  Due to rounding error, the percentages do not sum to 100.   28
standard deviation above the mean.  The first page of Table 5 presents results for these markets 
under the assumption of no report cards, i.e. the coefficients on the post interaction terms are set 
to zero and consumer responses to quality derive solely from market-based learning.  The second 
page incorporates the impact of the report cards; that is, we consider how publicizing the quality 
scores affects consumer demand beyond what would be predicted by market-based learning 
alone.  Note that in all scenarios, the standard errors of the predicted market shares are large 
relative to the mean changes in predicted market shares.  Thus, the unobserved random shock to 
quality in any given period overwhelms the movement in market share that is predicted to come 
about as a result of learning.  Nevertheless, the estimated effects of market-based and report-
card-induced learning are sizeable.   
By construction, in monopoly markets a medium-quality plan sees no systematic change in 
its market share due to learning; this plan earns quality z-scores of zero and beneficiaries are 
neither tempted to enroll nor disenroll as they learn this information.    If the plan is of high (low) 
quality, market-based learning results in a substantial increase (decrease) in market share over 
the 9-year study period.  The exact amount is on the order of 30-45 percent of enrollment.
 39   
The second part of Table 5 illustrates that report cards provide an extra boost (penalty) to the 
high- (low-) quality plans.  The size of the boost is 25 to 45 percent of the market-learning 
effect.
40  
Adding a second plan magnifies the impact of learning, as beneficiaries not only switch 
to/from traditional Medicare but also among available plans (assuming these plans have different 
                                                 
39 Although the larger estimate is obtained in the high-quality case, suggesting that the reward for high quality 
exceeds the penalty for low quality, this result is largely driven by the functional form we assume and hence we do 
not make this inference.  (When inverting the market share equation, we take a convex transformation of the quality 
scores.  This has the effect of magnifying increases (or equivalently, minimizing decreases) in quality.) 
40 The relative magnitude is calculated as (Mean market share in 2002 with report card – Mean market share in 2002 
without report card)/(Mean market share in 2002 without report card – Mean market share in 1994 without report 
card).   29
quality scores).  Table 5 contains estimates from a duopoly setting with one low and one high-
quality plan, as defined above.  Figure 4 depicts the results graphically.  The solid lines 
correspond to mean predicted shares without report cards, and the dotted lines include the report-
card effects.
41  The mean market share of the high-quality firm is predicted to double due to 
market-based learning between 1994 and 2002.  Most of this increase comes at the expense of 
the low-quality HMO, with roughly one-third of additional enrollees coming from traditional 
Medicare.    The report-card effect on market shares is also larger in the duopoly market, but 
only in absolute terms.  Relative to market-based learning, the report-card effect is 17 to 30 
percent as large.  The smaller relative importance of report cards in duopoly markets -- 
particularly for the low-quality plan -- reflects the smaller pool of enrollees in the low-quality 
plan by the time best care is released in 2002.  There are simply very few enrollees left to leave.  
For the same reason, most of the report-card induced increase in enrollment in the high-quality 
HMO comes from traditional Medicare, with only one-third due to further declines in the market 
share of the low-quality plan.   
Last, we introduce a third plan of medium quality.  As compared to the medium-quality 
monopolist, this plan loses market share over time even absent the report cards because some of 
its enrollees switch into the high-quality plan.  The high-quality plan therefore sees bigger 
enrollment gains over time and as a result of the report card.  The magnitude of the report card 
effect relative to the market-based learning effect ranges from 16 percent (for the low-quality 
plan) to 70 percent (for the medium-quality plan).  This is consistent with the discussion above: 
                                                 
41 Note that our specification does not permit the impact of report cards to vary over time, although the graph 
suggests otherwise.  The reason for this illusion is that different scores are released at different points in time.  
Mammography and communicate are released in Medicare and You 2001, and best care appears in Medicare and 
You 2002 (together with updated mammography scores).  The estimated coefficient on communicate*post is slightly 
negative, which produces the downward bump in post-report-card enrollment in the high-quality plan.   30
the relative importance of report cards depends on how big the gains (losses) are by 2001 (when 
the best care scores were released).   
While report-card learning is associated with sizeable swings in HMO market share, the 
absolute share of enrollees switching plans due to report cards is likely quite low.  The exact 
figures cannot be obtained without individual-level data, as we can only simulate final market 
shares.  In the final scenario in Table 5, net switching associated with the report-cards as of 2002 
is only 1.24 percent of beneficiaries.
42 
Table 6 contains results from a second set of scenarios designed to illustrate the effect of 
varying the absolute and relative quality levels of plans within a market.  For simplicity, we 




th percentiles.  This generates 9 unique combinations of scores.  All other 
assumptions are unchanged.  To consolidate the presentation of our results, we present only the 
2002 mean market shares (and standard errors) for both plans under each score combination, 
assuming report cards are distributed.  The 2002 shares should be contrasted with the initial 1994 
market share of 2.74 points for each plan; to facilitate these comparisons, the implied percent 
change in market share is reported in the bottom panel of Table 6. 
The results in Table 6 follow from the scenarios already discussed.  The entries along the 
diagonal (quality of both plans is the same) illustrate that the combined market share of HMOs 
increases in their average quality.  The gain to any individual plan from higher quality is largest 
when it is maximally differentiated from its competitor.  When these results are compared to the 
same scenarios without report cards (tables available upon request), we see that report cards are 
                                                 
42 This estimate is obtained by comparing the final market shares with and without report cards in 2002.  We add the 
absolute value of market-share changes due to the report-card, and divide the sum by two.  (Note this estimate is 
only an approximation because we apply the formula to the mean final market shares rather than to the market 
shares from each individual simulation.  We do this in the interest of clarity.  The estimate we report for the 
nationwide response is calculated by averaging the results from each simulation.)   31
associated with reallocations that are 19 to 85 percent as large as the reallocations associated 
with market-based learning.  (Consistent with the discussion above, the lowest estimate is 
obtained from a market with one low-quality plan and one high-quality plan).   
In a third set of (unreported) scenarios, we examine the relationship between individual 
heterogeneity (captured via income) and learning patterns.  We find that varying the proportion 
of individuals in each income quintile has little impact on predicted market shares.  This result is 
due in part to the relative magnitude of the income coefficients, and in part to our utility 
specification, in which income affects the choice of the HMO nest but not the choice within the 
HMO nest.  Thus, changing the hypothetical income distribution can affect the aggregate market 
shares of HMOs, but not the relative shares.  Given the low propensity for traditional enrollees of 
all income groups to switch into HMOs, the impact on market shares of a change in the income 
distribution is negligible.   
  In summary, the simulations suggest that both market-based learning and report cards 
generated substantial swings in the market shares of individual HMOs.  Although the impact of 
report cards on these market shares was substantial, it was smaller than that of cumulative 
market-based learning during the study period, and the proportion of those exposed to the report 
cards who actually responded was likely fairly low.  The exact figures cannot be obtained 
without individual-level data, as we can only simulate final market shares.  We can estimate net 
switching however, and this amounts to 3.1 percent nationwide.
43  Given the large estimate of the 
nesting parameter, switching by Medicare HMO enrollees was likely much greater than 
switching by traditional Medicare enrollees.    
                                                 
43 This national estimate is obtained by comparing market shares in 1999 (the year before report cards were released) 
and simulated market shares under the assumption report cards were available, ceteris paribus.     32
To compare the net switching figure with estimates from other settings, it is helpful to 
normalize it by the total national market share of Medicare HMOs in 2002, 12 percent.  The 
resulting ratio is fairly large relative to estimates from other settings, such as GM employees (3.9 
percent predicted to have switched due to HMO report cards/40 percent in HMOs) and federal 
retirees/survivors of retirees, (0.7 percent/12.5 percent).  The latter estimate is especially 
interesting because of the similarity of the study populations.  Part of the difference is likely due 
to the fact that Medicare & You was directly delivered to all beneficiaries’ mailboxes, whereas 
report cards for federal government HMOs had to be actively located (e.g. by purchasing U.S. 
News & World Report).   
  
5  Extensions and Robustness 
Our baseline model is designed to provide an unbiased estimate of the effect of report cards.  The 
trend variables control for the possibility that enrollees are acting on reported scores ahead of 
their release; we attribute such behavior to market-based learning.  In this section, we describe a 
series of extensions and robustness checks we perform to evaluate alternative hypotheses for this 
trend. 
5.1  Heterogeneity in Learning  
We begin by considering the mechanisms through which market-based learning may be 
occurring.  Our intepretation of the trend coefficients as evidence of market-based learning will 
be bolstered if the data are consistent with hypotheses about how this learning takes place.  We 
examine three potential channels for market-based learning: friends and family (proxied by 
stable population, the share of the 1995 county population still living in the county in 2000); 
prior HMO experience (proxied by HMO penetration, the county Medicare HMO penetration   33
rate in 1994, the start of the study period); and other published report cards (proxied by 
appearance of affiliated plans in the U.S. News “Best HMO” reports).
44  Descriptive statistics for 
these proxies are included in Table 1.  If word of mouth is a source of learning, we would expect 
a positive coefficient on the triple interaction term, composite*ln(year)*stable population, 
assuming population stability is correlated with the exchange of information among 
beneficiaries.  If enrollees learn from prior HMO experience, we would expect diminished 
market-based learning during the study period and therefore a negative coefficient on 
composite*ln(year)*HMO penetration.  Finally, if learning is facilitated by other sources of 
report-card data, we expect a positive coefficient on the interaction between composite*ln(year) 
and U.S. News, an indicator for whether all plans in a county have an affiliated plan that 
appeared at least once in the U.S. News publications.   
Table 7 reports the results of adding each of these terms, first separately and then jointly, 
to the baseline specification.  The original results from Table 4, column 3 are repeated in column 
1, followed by estimates obtained when adding interactions with the county z-score for stable 
population (column 2), the county z-score for HMO penetration (column 3), the U.S. News 
indicator (column 4), and all three together (column 5).  Note that main effects for the learning 
proxies are not needed due to the inclusion of county fixed effects in all specifications.   
The data support all three mechanisms, with the strongest evidence for learning 
facilitated by other report cards.   The magnitude of the learning coefficient in markets with 
complete U.S. News coverage is nearly double that in markets with incomplete or no coverage.
45  
A one-standard-deviation increase in stable population is associated with an increase of roughly 
                                                 
44 County demographic characteristics are from the U.S. Census Bureau and the 2002 Area Resource File.  
45 We do not incorporate the ratings measures reported by U.S. News due to the high number of missing values.  The 
correlation between composite and the overall U.S. News rating (which ranges from 1 to 4 stars) is .64 for plans with 
data from both sources.   34
35 percent in the learning coefficient, while a one-standard-deviation decrease in prior HMO 
experience is associated with an increase of  19 percent.  The coefficients on the score*post 
variables are not materially affected by the inclusion of the new interactions.  
To further examine heterogeneity in market-based learning and report card effects, we 
also considered interactions with county-level demographic measures such as the fraction of 
college graduates and the share of women aged 65-74 (who may be particularly interested in 
mammography scores of Medicare HMOs).  Studies have found that education is correlated with 
the use of healthcare information (e.g. Feldman et al 2000).  We find no significant relationships 
between these measures and the pace of learning. 
5.2  Specification Checks Using Contemporaneous Quality 
Our estimation strategy uses quality measured at a single point in time (i.e., the quality scores 
actually reported in the Medicare & You handbooks).  Ideally, we would add controls for 
contemporaneous quality.  The coefficients on these controls would reflect “real time” market-
based learning, while the coefficients on the reported measures would capture learning due to the 
report cards.  Unfortunately, panel quality data is limited to a subset of measures, plans, and 
years.
46  However, we are able to estimate a model in which 
(5) 




t j t j t j t s jc
post care   best   reported
post y mammograph   reported bestcare y mammograph x
ψ + κ + ω + +
+ + = − −
) (






t post takes on a value of 1 in 2000-2002, and 
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t post takes on a value of 1 in 2001-
2002.
47  Contemporaneous quality is lagged by one year due to the discrete nature of the data 
available; the earliest that beneficiaries can respond to quality measured during calendar year 
                                                 
46 Data on mammography is available for 1996-2001, on communicate from 1998-1999, on best care for 1998-2002, 
and on unreported composite for 1996-1998. 
47 Note that reported mammography and reported best care are the measures labeled as mammography and best care 
in the main specifications.   35
1997 is 1998.  Given the data limitations, the model can only be estimated using observations 
from 1999-2002.  All instruments are the same as in the main model.  Descriptive statistics for 
the panel data appear in Appendix Table 3. 
The results, presented in Table 8, corroborate our main findings.  The coefficient 
estimates on both contemporaneous quality measures are positive and statistically significant, 
and the best care estimate is similar to that obtained in all prior specifications.
48   Unlike prior 
results, the mammography*post coefficient in this model is positive and statistically-significant.  
However, the estimated nesting parameter is significantly different from 1, suggesting the 
modeling assumptions are not satisfied in this sample.  We are therefore hesitant to emphasize 
the findings from this specification. 
5.3 Plan  Benefits 
The identifying assumption of the main specification is that no omitted, plan-specific, time-
varying factor is correlated with both reported quality and enrollment decisions.  Apart from 
contemporaneous quality (addressed above), plan benefits are the most likely candidate for such 
a factor.  If high-quality plans are more or less likely to increase benefits over time, the trend 
variable will reflect these characteristics as well as learning about quality.  Similarly, if plans 
react to high reported scores by lowering plan benefits (because they can “afford” to do so in 
light of their scores), the post interaction terms will be downward-biased. 
To examine the possibility that changes in benefits are biasing the coefficient estimates, 
we assemble panel data on prescription drug benefits offered by plans.  Prescription drugs 
                                                 
48 Because specification 3 is limited to 1999-2002, we use the mammography data from 1996-2001 to further 
confirm that changes in contemporaneous plan quality are not producing the enrollment trend toward highly-rated 
plans.  If plans with high initial quality are more likely to improve their benefits over time, consumers’ valuation of 
these improvements will be captured in the market-based learning term.  We therefore regress the change in 
mammography between 1996 and 2001 on reported mammography (which is measured in 1997).  We obtain a 
coefficient estimate of 0.08 (0.12), providing little support for this alternative explanation. 
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accounted for one-third of direct out-of-pocket spending by Medicare beneficiaries in 1999, and 
likely more for beneficiaries without supplemental insurance policies, the primary target market 
for Medicare HMOs.
49  Town and Liu (2003) estimate that 45 percent of the consumer surplus 
generated by the Medicare HMO program in 2000 was due to prescription drug coverage 
provided by (some of) the plans.  For 1994-2000, we have an indicator of drug coverage for the 
“base” option within each plan, provided by Town and Liu.
50  For 2000-2004, CMS provided us 
with indicators of drug coverage for all options within a plan, but we lack the “base” identifier 
included in the earlier data.
51  However, the median indicator for each plan in 2000 matches the 
base plan indicator in 2000 fairly well (sample mean of .85 vs. .83, respectively), so we use the 
median indicator for 2001-2004.
52 
Column 4 in Table 4 presents the results from the main specification with the addition of 
this drug coverage indicator.  The coefficient estimate on drug coverage is positive but 
imprecisely estimated, and the magnitudes of the coefficients of interest are not materially 
affected. Although prescription drug coverage is but one of the unobserved plan characteristics in 
our models, this analysis suggests that unobserved changes in plan benefits are not driving the 
results. 
                                                 
49 “Direct” out-of-pocket spending excludes premium payments for Medicare and supplemental insurance policies. 
(Source: “Program Information on Medicare, Medicaid, SCHIP, and other programs of the Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services,” Office of Research, Development, and Information, June 2002.)   
50 In 1999 and 2000, this indicator varies slightly across counties, so we use the maximum indicator for each plan-
year.  Town and Liu obtained the 1994-1998 data from the Medicare Coordinated Care Plans Monthly Reports, 
ibid., and the 1999-2000 data from the Medicare Compare Database. 
51 We obtained detailed benefits data for all options offered by participating plans in 2000-2004 by direct request to 
CMS.  The base plan is not identified, nor is enrollment data (which might be useful in identifying this plan) 
included. 
52 Note that any systematic change in the drug coverage indicator between 2000 and 2001 will be captured by the 
year dummies.   37
5.4  Other Robustness Checks 
The BBA included several reforms to the Medicare program, some of which may have induced 
the observed associations between reported scores and enrollments.  We identified a key, testable 
candidate: a series of provisions designed to increase Medicare HMO penetration in rural 
counties.
53  If rural counties have particularly low or high-quality plans, our learning coefficients 
will reflect these other reforms.  We find that 23 percent of the plan-county-year observations in 
our data are from such counties.  The results are unchanged when these observations are 
dropped.  In addition, running the model using only the rural observations yields very similar 
coefficient estimates. 
We also considered three additional specification checks.  First, we replaced standardized 
quality scores with actual scores, and found the results were robust to this change.   Second, we 
replaced the premium with a binary price indicator coded as 1 for a positive premium.  (Using 
data on plan switching by University of California employees, Buchmueller and Feldstein (1997) 
found that most switched out of plans requiring premiums to free plans.)  The premium 
coefficient was again small and imprecisely estimated.  Third, we confirmed that the results are 
not affected by changing post to a common definition for all scores (either taking a value of 1 
beginning in 2000, or in 2001). 
 
6 Conclusions 
Governments often evaluate the quality of various products and services and publish such 
information for consumers.  The value of these initiatives depends, in part, on the pace at which 
consumers learn about quality in their absence.  The health insurance market, through which 
                                                 
53 These reforms are summarized in Schoenman (1999).  We use the “urban influence” measure developed by the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture to identify urban areas (defined as counties located in metropolitan areas).     38
nearly 13 percent of GDP flows, is perhaps the most important laboratory for these government 
initiatives.
54   
Using panel data on Medicare HMOs and a discrete choice demand model, we examine 
whether and how Medicare enrollees learn about the quality of Medicare HMOs.  We arrive at 
four main conclusions.  First, between 1994 and 2002 Medicare enrollees were switching into 
higher-quality plans independently of the government report cards issued in 1999 and 2000, 
where quality is measured as a composite of the 6 available audited quality scores.  This trend, 
which we call “market-based learning,” was strongest in markets in which U.S. News provided 
report cards, and in which migration and prior HMO experience was relatively low.  These 
findings suggest that market-based learning is facilitated through the private release of report 
cards, word-of-mouth, and prior experience.  The evidence for market-based learning implies 
that the effect of report cards is typically overestimated. 
Second, after controlling for market-based learning, we still find a response to the 
Medicare report cards.  The report-card effect is entirely due to beneficiaries’ responses to 
consumer satisfaction scores; other reported quality measures such as the mammography rate did 
not affect enrollment.  Given that public report cards are often justified on the grounds that 
individuals’ subjective opinions are not good measures of the true quality of health care, it is 
surprising that satisfaction scores were included in the report cards, and potentially disconcerting 
that consumers ignored an alternative, objective measure of quality that was also provided.  In 
our data, enrollee satisfaction is uncorrelated with the mammography rate as well as other 
measures that are believed to reflect best practices in disease screening and prevention.  This fact 
has been documented in several studies of quality measures (e.g. Schneider et al 2001 and Rao et 
                                                 
54 This figure is calculated as the ratio of total national health expenditures, less out-of-pocket expenditures, divided 
by GDP.  Because out-of-pocket expenses are often determined by health insurers, this is certainly an underestimate.  
Source: U.S. Statistical Abstract (1996), Table 118.    39
al 2006).   Further analysis of unreported satisfaction measures suggests “ease of obtaining 
specialist referrals” is the component of satisfaction driving our results.  Whether this is 
positively correlated with better health is an open question.  Regardless, the emphasis on average 
enrollee satisfaction creates an incentive for plans to maximize ratings by directing resources 
toward average enrollees and away from outliers with catastrophic or expensive chronic 
conditions, precisely the individuals for whom insurance is most valuable.
55   
Third, we find report-card interventions as well as market-based learning have the 
greatest impact in markets with providers of varying quality levels.  Though obvious, this point 
implies interventions will be most valuable when multiple firms are present, and when these 
firms are differentiated.  It is of course possible that the act of reporting quality data will 
ultimately lead to differentiation on reported dimensions even if little differentiation is present ex 
ante. 
Fourth, our estimates suggest that the Medicare report cards produced substantial swings 
in market shares among Medicare HMOs (i.e. the “within HMO nest shares”), but only drew a 
small fraction of enrollees in traditional Medicare into Medicare HMOs.  This result is consistent 
with prior research in the private sector (using PPOs as the outside option), and suggests that 
quality report cards alone will be insufficient to persuade Medicare enrollees to abandon 
traditional Medicare for the Medicare HMO program (currently known as Medicare Advantage).   
Although our findings pertain to a large and important population, we caution against 
extrapolating the results to other settings.  Studies of healthplan choice reveal that plan switching 
occurs less frequently among the aged (e.g. Jin and Sorensen 2006).  The healthcare needs, 
                                                 
55 Prior research on the effect of enrollee satisfaction on health plan choices is mixed.  Abraham et al. (2006) find an 
employee’s self-rated satisfaction with her healthplan is not associated with her propensity to switch, while 
Buchmueller and Feldstein (1997) find benefit managers’ rating of enrollee satisfaction is associated with enrollees’ 
propensity to switch. 
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preferences, and learning patterns of the elderly might differ significantly from those of the 
nonelderly.   
Evaluating the aggregate welfare effects of government report cards requires complete 
estimates of supply-side responses, as well as estimates of the effects of healthplan quality on 
health, and of health on welfare.  The latter two subjects are clearly beyond the scope of this 
paper.  As for the former, examining plan responses to Medicare & You is difficult due to the 
absence of pre-mandate quality data, as well as simultaneous changes in Medicare payment rates.  
Setting aside data and identification concerns, a priori there are several reasons to expect a small 
response by plans during our study period.  First, plans were required to report hundreds of 
measures, and CMS did not announce which would be publicized to enrollees.  As compared to 
restaurant hygiene inspections, where a final summary grade is posted and the weights on the 
component scores are known, this setting made it difficult for suppliers to figure out which 
dimensions to improve.   Second, plans may not have anticipated a significant enrollee response 
to the quality data, both because of assumptions about behavior of the elderly and/or because 
they underestimated CMS’ commitment to disseminating the data.   As more recent data 
becomes available, it will be possible to see whether plans focus disproportionately on improving 
their scores on measures included in Medicare & You.  Investigating the extent to which firms 
“teach to the test” and skimp on unreported quality is an important area for future research, and 
one of many inputs that will be needed to estimate the welfare effects of measuring and publicly 
disclosing quality information.    41
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Statistics, National Enrollment Trends; U.S. Statistical Abstract, various 
years; Health, United States, 2003 (CDC).  Comparable data for 1996 is 






















Figure 2.  Example of Medicare Report Card Appearing in Medicare & You 2001 
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Notes: Coefficient estimates from 3 separate models in which each score is interacted with individual year dummies.  











































































Notes: Figure is based on duopoly simulation results in Table 5.  Solid lines depict 
share changes associated with market-based learning only; dashed lines add report-
card learning.   
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Mean Std.  Dev. 
Plan Characteristics    
    
Enrollment (#)  3,559  9,134 
Share of county eligibles (%)  4.58  6.60 
Share of county HMO enrollment (%)  49.98  41.66 
    
Reported Quality Measures    
Mammography (%)  75.71  7.39 
Communicate (%)  69.95  4.91 
Best Care (%)  49.52  6.22 
Unreported Quality Measures    
Betablocker (%)  81.20  12.66 
Diabetic Eye Exams (%)  59.11  12.71 
Ambulatory Visit (%)  88.72  8.03 
    
Monthly premium ($)  16.56  24.73 
Affiliate in U.S. News (%)  65.17  47.65 
CMS monthly payment rate ($)  495.53  96.62 
Prescription drug coverage (%)  70.19  45.39 
    
Market Characteristics    
    
Number of rivals (#)  2.24  2.35 
Number of rivals belonging to a chain (#)  1.70  1.97 
Number of not-for-profit rivals (#)  1.08  1.27 
Number of IPA rivals (#)  1.17  1.53 
Stable population share, 1995 to 2000  (%)  79.70  9.40 
Medicare HMO penetration rate, 1994 (%)  8.67  11.87 
Percent of population aged 65-74, 2000 (%)  7.10  2.21 
Percent with college degree, 2000 (%)  15.78  6.51 
 
Notes: N=8212.  The unit of observation is the plan-county-year.  Sample 
includes observations with 10 or more Medicare enrollees and nonmissing 
data for all variables.  Quality measures correspond to data reported in 
Medicare & You 2000 (2001 for best care).  Stable population share is the 
share of a county's 1995 population still living in the county in 2000.  All 








Table 2.  Market Characteristics 
 
  Number of 
Mean of (Max-Min) quality scores 
[Mean of (Max-Min) standardized quality scores] 
Number of Plans  Markets  Mammography  Communicate  Best care 
        
1 240  -  -  - 



















Notes: Sample includes all markets (=counties) in 2000. Quality scores correspond to data 
reported in Medicare & You 2000 (2001 for best care).  Standardized values have mean zero 







Table 3. Correlation Matrix for Quality Scores 
 
 Mammography  Communicate  Best  Care 
Unreported 
Composite 
        
Mammography 1.00      
Communicate 0.10  1.00     
Best Care  0.02   0.82  1.00   
Unreported composite  0.73  0.17  0.05  1.00 
 
Notes: Sample includes all markets (=counties) in 2000.  Quality measures correspond to data 
reported in Medicare & You 2000 (2001 for best care). 
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Table 4. Effect of Quality on Mean Plan Utility 
                 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Market Learning      
   Mammography*ln(year)  0.100**  0.064      
 (0.037)  (0.050)     
   Communicate*ln(year)    0.125
†   0.093      
 (0.068)  (0.076)     
   Best care*ln(year)  0.026   0.062      
 (0.075)  (0.085)     
   Unrep. Composite*ln(year)    0.063      
   (0.074)    
   Composite*ln(year)           0.279***       0.278 *** 
     (0.067)  (0.068) 
Report Card Effect      
   Mammography*post  -0.009   -0.012   0.002   0.005  
  (0.039) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
   Communicate*post  -0.052   -0.059   -0.024   -0.015  
  (0.038) (0.041) (0.045) (0.046) 
   Best care*post  0.145*  0.158*  0.178*  0.165* 
  (0.057) (0.062) (0.071) (0.073) 
   Unreported composite*post    0.033   -0.025   -0.036  
   (0.108)  (0.093)  (0.094) 
Price      
   Monthly premium  0.003   0.001   0.000   0.001  
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Benefits      
   Prescription drug coverage        0.024  
       (0.043) 
Income Quintile Fixed Effects (relative to the highest quintile) 
   Quintile 1  0.170   0.157   0.154   0.132  
  (0.177) (0.177) (0.178) (0.179) 
   Quintile 2  0.196   0.186   0.195   0.189  
  (0.187) (0.187) (0.186) (0.186) 
   Quintile 3  0.357*  0.356*  0.367*  0.371* 
  (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) 
   Quintile 4        0.456***       0.461***       0.463***        0.459*** 
  (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) 
Nesting Parameter        0.838***       0.838***       0.840***        0.839*** 
    (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
N  8212 8212 8212 8212 
Notes: All specifications include plan, county, and state-year fixed effects.  Post is an indicator variable 
that takes a value of one beginning in 2000 (2001 for best care interactions). Z-scores are used for all 
quality measures (composite, mammography, communicate, best care, and unreported composite). 
Estimation is by 3SGMM; price and the within-nest share are treated as endogenous.  Standard errors 
are adjusted for correlation in residuals for the same plan-county over time. 
† denotes p<.10, * denotes p<.05, ** denotes p<.01, *** denotes p<.001 
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Table 5. Evolution of Predicted Market Shares in Hypothetical Markets 
              
No Report Card  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  Δ % Δ 
Monopoly Market                                             
    Sole  plan  (Low  quality)  2.74 2.43 2.24 2.15 2.05 2.02    1.94 1.89 1.86  -0.88 -32.0%
    (2.13) (1.95) (1.67) (1.66) (1.59) (1.73) (1.64) (1.51) (1.62)        
    Sole  plan  (Medium  quality)  2.74 2.74 2.72 2.74 2.71 2.77    2.73 2.72 2.73  -0.01  -0.3%
    (2.13) (2.15) (1.97) (2.05) (2.02) (2.25) (2.18) (2.06) (2.22)        
    Sole  plan  (High  quality)  2.74 3.09 3.29 3.48 3.58 3.76    3.81 3.89 3.98 1.24 45.3%
    (2.13) (2.37) (2.32) (2.52) (2.54) (2.89) (2.86) (2.77) (3.00)        
Duopoly Market                                             
    Low  quality  plan  2.76 1.95 1.57 1.33 1.19 1.05    1.00 0.93 0.85  -1.91 -69.4%
  (3.54) (3.13) (2.84) (2.61) (2.57) (2.55) (2.31) (2.58) (2.36)    
    High  quality  plan  2.72 3.59 4.06 4.54 4.77 5.00    5.14 5.31 5.53 2.81  103.4%
    (3.46) (3.71) (3.74) (4.30) (4.07) (4.08) (4.30) (4.12) (4.39)        
Triopoly Market                                             
    Low  quality  plan  2.79 1.97 1.54 1.30 1.17 1.06    0.98 0.89 0.82  -1.98 -70.8%
  (4.48) (3.83) (3.53) (3.13) (3.00) (3.06) (3.10) (2.80) (2.77)    
    Medium  quality  plan  2.69 2.69 2.54 2.60 2.38 2.42    2.39 2.31 2.30  -0.40 -14.8%
  (4.34) (4.23) (4.17) (4.42) (3.98) (4.19) (4.22) (4.24) (4.28)    
    High  quality  plan  2.74 3.57 4.24 4.61 5.00 5.24    5.51 5.77 6.00 3.26  119.0%
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Table 5. Evolution of Predicted Market Shares in Hypothetical Markets (continued) 
             
With Report Card  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  Δ % Δ 
Monopoly Market                                             
    Sole  plan  (Low  quality)  2.74 2.43 2.24 2.15 2.05 2.02    2.02 1.65 1.63  -1.11 -40.7%
    (2.13) (1.95) (1.67) (1.66) (1.59) (1.73) (1.70) (1.34) (1.44)        
    Sole  plan  (Medium  quality)  2.74 2.74 2.72 2.74 2.71 2.77    2.73 2.72 2.73  -0.01  -0.3%
    (2.13) (2.15) (1.97) (2.05) (2.02) (2.25) (2.18) (2.06) (2.22)        
    Sole  plan  (High  quality)  2.74 3.09 3.29 3.48 3.58 3.76    3.68 4.44 4.54 1.80 65.6%
    (2.13) (2.37) (2.32) (2.52) (2.54) (2.89) (2.78) (3.08) (3.32)        
Duopoly Market                                             
    Low  quality  plan  2.76 1.95 1.57 1.33 1.19 1.05    1.13 0.58 0.53  -2.23 -81.0%
  (3.54) (3.13) (2.84) (2.61) (2.57) (2.55) (2.43) (2.20) (1.98)    
    High  quality  plan  2.72 3.59 4.06 4.54 4.77 5.00    4.88 6.30 6.53 3.81  140.0%
    (3.46) (3.71) (3.74) (4.30) (4.07) (4.08) (4.23) (4.42) (4.71)        
Triopoly Market                                             
    Low  quality  plan  2.79 1.97 1.54 1.30 1.17 1.06    1.10 0.54 0.51  -2.28 -81.8%
  (4.48) (3.83) (3.53) (3.13) (3.00) (3.06) (3.24) (2.31) (2.29)    
    Medium  quality  plan  2.69 2.69 2.54 2.60 2.38 2.42    2.45 2.04 2.02  -0.67 -25.0%
  (4.34) (4.23) (4.17) (4.42) (3.98) (4.19) (4.24) (4.17) (4.20)    
    High  quality  plan  2.74 3.57 4.24 4.61 5.00 5.24    5.17 7.08 7.31 4.57  167.0%
    (4.30) (4.76) (5.02) (5.21) (5.37) (5.33) (5.44) (6.13) (6.08)        
 
Notes:  Tables report mean market shares (standard errors) from simulations using the model in Table 4, column 3.  Unobserved, time-invariant 
plan quality is the same for all plans; the magnitude is selected so that mean market share in 1994 is 2.74 percentage points (the national average in 
that year).  Reported mean market shares may differ due to the randomly-drawn time-varying unobserved quality term.  Number of simulations is 
10,000 for each cell.     53
 
Table 6.  Simulated Outcomes in Duopoly Markets in 2002, with Report Card 
                                           
Market Shares 
 
   Plan 2 Quality 
       Low  Medium  High 
Plan 1 Quality  Plan  1  Plan  2  Total  Plan  1  Plan  2  Total  Plan  1  Plan  2  Total 
Low  Mean  1.67  1.64 3.31        
   S.D.  (2.28)  (2.25) (2.45)                        
Medium  Mean 3.60 1.01 4.61 2.77 2.71  5.48      
    S.D.  (3.35) (2.20) (3.23) (3.56) (3.49)  (3.65)            
High  Mean 6.53 0.53 7.06 5.89 1.65  7.54 4.49 4.41 8.90
    S.D.  (4.71) (1.98) (4.54) (5.04) (3.40)  (4.69) (5.40) (5.29) (5.19)
               
Growth Rates 
 
   Plan 2 Quality 
       Low  Medium  High 
Plan 1 Quality  Plan  1  Plan  2  Total  Plan  1  Plan  2  Total  Plan 1  Plan  2  Total 
Low  Mean  -38.92%  -40.14% -39.53%        
Medium  Mean  31.49%  -63.31% -15.91% 1.03%  -0.94%  0.04%    
High Mean 138.36% -80.84% 28.76% 114.92% -39.89%  37.52% 64.01% 60.97% 62.49%
 
Notes:  Table reports mean market shares (standard errors) from simulations using the model in Table 4, column 3.  Unobserved, time-invariant plan quality is 
the same for all plans; the magnitude is selected so that mean market share in 1994 is 2.74 percentage points (the national average in that year).  Reported mean 
market shares may differ due to the randomly-drawn time-varying unobserved quality term.  Number of simulations is 10,000 for each cell.  Growth rates are 
calculated using 2.74 as the initial market share. 
   54
 
 
Table 7. Sources of Market Learning 
                       
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Market Learning       
   Composite*ln(year)     0.279
***     0.262
***     0.322
***     0.222
***     0.250
*** 
  (0.067) (0.066) (0.072) (0.064) (0.070) 
   Composite*ln(year)*stable population      0.092
**        0.099
** 
   (0.033)    (0.034) 
   Composite*ln(year)*HMO penetration        -0.058
**     -0.051
* 
     (0.021)  (0.020) 
   Composite*ln(year)*U.S. News          0.172
**   0.141
* 
      (0.066)  (0.067) 
Report Card Effect       
      Mammography*post  0.002 0.009 0.010 0.001 0.015 
  (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
      Communicate*post  -0.024 -0.025 -0.025 -0.034 -0.036 
  (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.042) 
   Best care*post   0.178
*   0.171
*   0.180
*    0.184
**   0.180
* 
  (0.071) (0.071) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) 
      Unreported  composite*post  -0.025 -0.033 -0.030 -0.024 -0.036 
  (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) 
Price       
   Monthly Premium  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Income Quintile Fixed Effects (relative to the highest quintile) 
      Quintile  1  0.154 0.168 0.153 0.162 0.172 
  (0.178) (0.176) (0.177) (0.176) (0.174) 
      Quintile  2  0.195 0.201 0.190 0.179 0.184 
  (0.186) (0.186) (0.186) (0.186) (0.185) 
   Quintile 3   0.367
*   0.361
*   0.366
*   0.366
*   0.359
* 
  (0.147) (0.147) (0.146) (0.146) (0.145) 
   Quintile 4     0.463
***     0.459
***     0.458
***     0.470
***     0.459
*** 
  (0.112) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.110) 
Nesting Parameter     0.840
***     0.844
***     0.840
***     0.838
***     0.844
*** 
    (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) 
N  8212 8212 8212 8212 8212 
Notes: All specifications include plan, county, and state-year fixed effects.  Post is an indicator variable that 
takes a value of one beginning in 2000 (2001 for best care interactions). Z-scores are used for all quality 
measures (composite, mammography, communicate, best care, and unreported composite), stable population 
and HMO penetration.  U.S. News takes on a value of 1 if all plans in a county-year have affiliates that 
appeared in the U.S. News “Best HMOs” articles at least once, and 0 otherwise.  Estimation is by 3SGMM; 
price and the within-nest share are treated as endogenous.  Standard errors are adjusted for correlation in 
residuals for the same plan-county over time. 
† denotes p<.10, * denotes p<.05, ** denotes p<.01, *** denotes p<.001   55
 
Table 8. Effect of Contemporaneous and Reported Quality on Mean Plan Utility 
  
Market Learning   
  (Lagged) contemporaneous mammography   0.084
* 
  (0.042) 
  (Lagged) contemporaneous best care    0.141
** 
  (0.045) 
Report Card Effect   
  (Reported) mammography*post   0.075
* 
  (0.034) 
  (Reported) best care*post    0.180
** 
  (0.059) 
Price   
   Monthly premium  -0.008
† 
  (0.004) 
Income Quintile Fixed Effects (relative to the highest quintile) 
   Quintile 1  0.180 
  (0.203) 
   Quintile 2  -0.162 
  (0.249) 
   Quintile 3  0.183 
  (0.141) 
   Quintile 4  0.058 
  (0.166) 
Nesting Parameter       1.130
*** 
   (0.073) 
N  3408 
  
Notes: All specifications include plan, county, and state-year fixed effects.  Post is an indicator variable that takes
a value of one beginning in 2000 for mammography, and 2001 for best care.  Annual z-scores are used for 
mammography and best care. Estimation is by 3SGMM; price and the within-nest share are treated as 
endogenous.  Standard errors are adjusted for correlation in residuals for the same plan-county over time.   
† denotes p<.10, * denotes p<.05, ** denotes p<.01, *** denotes p<.001   56
Appendix 1.  Estimation 
 
The model differs from a standard nested logit due to the inclusion of a separate intercept for 
each income quintile. This produces different mean utility equations for each quintile q.  These 
are associated with the quintile-specific choice probabilities, Q q
q
t s jc s ,..., 1 ) ( } { = , in the following way, 
derived by Berry (1994): 
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However, since the observed market shares are weighted averages of these choice probabilities, 
with the weights representing the share of the population in each income quintile, the closed 
form inversion formula no longer applies.  We therefore use BLP’s contraction mapping theorem 
to derive the mean utility numerically. 
An important characteristic of our specification is that the quintile-specific intercepts 
have an impact only on the choice of the nest but not on the choice of HMO plan within the nest. 
As a result, the choice probabilities over individual HMO plans are identical across income 
quintiles, conditional on the choice of the HMO nest. We can take advantage of this feature to 
replace a part of the numerical inversion procedure with a simple formula. For this, we designate 







t s jc ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( δ δ δ − ≡ Δ . It can be shown that the differential mean utility is common 
across income quintiles and coincides with the log difference of the common conditional choice 
probabilities: 
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Next, note  0 ) ( 1 = Δ t s c δ  by construction and 
() ∑ = Δ +
=
J
k t s kc
t s c g s
2 ) (




.   57
It remains to obtain  Q q
q
t s c ,..., 1 ) ( 1 } { = δ  to finalize the estimation equation.  This segment of 
estimation exploits the observed choice of the nest and requires BLP’s numerical inversion 
procedure.   First, rewrite the quintile-specific market share of the outside good as a function of 
quintile-specific mean utility and the observed within share: 
(A3) 
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The aggregate market share of the outside good is a weighted average of the quintile-specific 
shares: 
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t s c ) ( λ  are the weights. Holding the quintile-specific intercepts  Q q
q
,..., 1 } { = γ fixed, the 
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Appendix Table 1.  Scores Reported in Medicare & You 
 
Measure Description  Data  Years 
(Sources)  
for Scores 




Reported in 2001 
mammography  % of women 50-69 
receiving a 
mammogram 
within past 2 years 
1996-1997 
(1998 HEDIS file) 
1997-1998 
(1999 HEDIS file) 
communicate %  enrollees 
reporting the 







best care  % enrollees rating 
their own care a 10 
out of 10 
Not reported  1999 
(2001 Medicare 
Compare Database) 










       Note: Measures matched to enrollment data are shaded in gray.  59








Appendix Table 2. Effect of Quality on Mean Plan Utility, 
Separate Models For Each Score 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Score  Mammography Communicate  Best  Care 
     
Score*1995 -.023  .004  -.032 
  (.051) (.041) (.042) 
Score*1996 .087  .066  -.017 
  (.059) (.060) (.062) 
Score*1997 .071    .142
* .062 
  (.061) (.062) (.064) 
Score*1998   .119
†    .173
** .089 
  (.063) (.063) (.064) 
Score*1999   .122
†     .240
***   .119
† 
  (.065) (.067) (.066) 
Score*2000   .140
*     .276
***   .127
† 
  (.067) (.070) (.068) 
Score*2001  .079     .266
***    .226
** 
  (.065) (.074) (.075) 
Score*2002  .114    .236
**    .272
** 
  (.074) (.083) (.093) 
Price     
Monthly premium  .004   .009
* .004 
  (.004) (.004) (.004) 
Nesting parameter     .838
***     .825
***     .837
*** 
  (.047) (.047) (.047) 
N  8212 8212 8212 
 
Notes: All specifications include plan, county, state-year, and income quintile fixed effects. Z-
scores are used for all quality measures.  Estimation is by 3SGMM; price and the within-nest share 
are treated as endogenous.  Standard errors are adjusted for correlation in residuals for the same 
plan-county over time. 



















Appendix Table 3.  Panel Quality Data 
 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 
      
Mammography    76.47  75.94 76.34 76.67 
  (6.15) (6.58) (6.58) (5.68) 
Best  Care  50.21 49.60 48.30 43.31 
  (7.33) (6.22) (6.01) (6.37) 
N (number of plan-counties)  1124  1024  870  748 
 
Notes: The unit of observation is the plan-county-year.  Sample includes observations with 10 or more 
Medicare enrollees and nonmissing data for all reported quality measures.  All data is reported in 
percentages unless otherwise indicated.  Standard deviations are in parentheses.  